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Juvenile Sentencing in Illinois: Addressing
the Supreme Court Trend away from Harsh
Punishments for Juvenile Offenders
MAUREEN DOWLING*
The United States Supreme Court has steadily been changing the way
it approaches juvenile sentencing since 2005. This ideological shift has
occurred as a response to the increase in biological and sociological studies, which point toward fundamental differences between juveniles and
adults. This Note addresses how the new mandates by the Supreme Court
have been implemented around the country, with a focus on statutory
changes Illinois should make moving forward. Specifically, this Note argues that there are several adjustments Illinois will have to make in regards
to the way it sentences juvenile homicide offenders, in order to be considered Constitutional based on the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in
Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama. First,
lengthy, consecutive term-of-years sentences should be abolished because it
does not give juvenile offenders the “meaningful opportunity for release”
required by Graham. This Note suggests that courts need to look at the idea
of a “meaningful opportunity for release” differently when sentencing juveniles as opposed to adult offenders, because studies have shown that adolescents who are imprisoned have a much lower life expectancy than average. Second, Illinois should amend its sentencing statutes to require judges
to consider several factors, while on record at a sentencing hearing, before
sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to life in prison. These factors, laid
out within this Note, will put Illinois at the forefront of ethical juvenile sentencing, while also ensuring that it does not violate the authority of Miller.
Admittedly, these theories have been criticized for being too ‘soft’ on punishment for juveniles who are convicted of felony murder. However, the
suggestions in this Note are meant to allow for the protection of the adolescent’s Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment,
while also considering the severity and nature of the offense.
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I.

I. INTRODUCTION
At five feet and one hundred pounds, Addolfo Davis was newly fourteen when he was arrested for home invasion and double homicide.1 The
crime and his subsequent conviction were a shock to those closest to him.
But, to the probation officers who had dealt with him before, it was only a
matter of time before something like this happened.2
Davis was eight years old when his drug-addicted mother lost custody
of him.3 He was sent to live with his elderly grandmother in a one-room,
basement apartment.4 At nine years old, Davis had committed his first rob1.
Linda Paul, Addolfo Davis’ Story, WBEZ91.5
http://www.wbez.org/story/news/local/addolfo-davis-story.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.

(Apr.

9,

2008),

2015]

JUVENILE SENTENCING IN ILLINOIS

613

bery.5 While pumping gas to make some money, he stole a girl’s purse in
order to buy food.6 By the time Davis was thirteen years old, he had joined
a gang and was selling drugs.7
At the age of fourteen, Davis was made a ward of the state and removed from his grandmother’s custody when it was determined that she
could not provide the discipline or stability that he needed.8 A probation
officer, who had been working with Davis, asked that he not be placed in a
temporary group home because the officer knew that without the necessary
structure and discipline, Davis would run away.9 The probation officer’s
prediction came true when Davis ran away almost immediately after being
placed in a temporary shelter.10 Five days later, Davis accompanied some
members of his gang to a home where he was told a drug deal would be
happening.11 Tragically, some of the older gang members fatally shot two
men.12 Even though he did not personally shoot anyone that day, Davis was
charged and found guilty of two counts of first degree murder, two counts
of attempted first degree murder, and home invasion.13 Davis was sentenced
to a term of natural life, without the possibility of parole.14
A.

PURPOSE

This Note will examine the shift in attitude by the United States Supreme Court in regards to juvenile sentencing and how Illinois should reform its statutory juvenile sentencing scheme with a focus on felony murder. First, it will look at the Supreme Court’s analysis of several cases involving juveniles and what each means in regards to sentencing. Then it
will briefly discuss how states have applied these new sentencing standards.
Additionally, it will look at how Illinois has dealt with juvenile sentencing
currently and in the past. Finally, it will suggest a new approach to juvenile
sentencing in Illinois and how those changes should be implemented.

5.
Id.
6.
Linda Paul, Addolfo Davis’ Story, WBEZ91.5
http://www.wbez.org/story/news/local/addolfo-davis-story.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Linda Paul, Addolfo Davis’ Story, WBEZ91.5
http://www.wbez.org/story/news/local/addolfo-davis-story.
12.
Id.
13.
Illinois v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 5, 6 N.E.3d 709, 714.
14.
Id.

(Apr.

9,

2008),

(Apr.

9,

2008),
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IMPORTANCE

Beyond the analysis and justification from the United States Supreme
Court for differences in juvenile and adult sentencing, juvenile sentencing
can primarily be viewed as a morality issue. The United States is one of
only two nations (the other being Somalia) that has not ratified a United
Nations convention requiring a minimum age of criminal culpability.15 Furthermore, the United States is the only country that sentences children to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.16 Even if one ignores
the clear directives from the United States Supreme Court on sentencing
differences for juveniles and adults, it is striking that this nation stands
alone on this issue.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted the differences between
juveniles and adults as justification for sentencing differences.17 This Note
will argue that implementing a new style of juvenile sentencing is especially important in the State of Illinois because Illinois faces unique challenges
involving crime and gangs. There are a number of factors that have caused
Chicago to continually struggle with high rates of crime, especially homicide.18 These factors include: poverty, gang activity, political corruption,
and struggling public schools.19 However, there is a general consensus
among many criminal theorists that the key to reducing crime is in how we
deal with juvenile offenders. 20
Sadly, Addolfo Davis’s story is far too common among young criminals. Many of these children find love and acceptance in gangs, which they
did not find at home.21 Like Davis, these kids do not receive consistent discipline or stability.22 Young gang members end up involved in situations,
15.
Hanna Kozlowska, Should a Child Offender be Treated as an Adult?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014, 11:33 AM), http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/should-achild-offender-be-treated-as-an-adult/?_r=0.
16.
Id.
17.
E.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
18.
Steve Bogira, The Root Cause of Chicago’s Glut of Murders, CHI. READER (July
10, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2012/07/10/the-rootcause-of-chicagos-glut-of-murders.
19.
See Noah Berlatsky, How Bad is Violence in Chicago? Depends on Your Race,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
26,
2013,
11:21
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/how-bad-is-violence-in-chicagodepends-on-your-race/280019/.
20.
See WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, Benefits and Costs of Prevention and
Early
Intervention
Programs
For
Youth
(2004),
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/881/Wsipp_Benefits-and-Costs-of-Prevention-andEarly-Intervention-Programs-for-Youth_Summary-Report.pdf.
21.
See JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, Why Do Youth Join Gangs? (1998),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/jjbulletin/9808/why.html.
22.
See id.
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without understanding the consequences, until they are sentenced to pay for
those mistakes for the rest of their lives.23 It seems as though a day does not
go by without a news article decrying the rate of homicides in Chicago.24
This Note will argue that juvenile sentencing changes are especially important in Illinois because of the crime issues this state faces. Since 2000,
Illinois has seen higher rates of homicide committed by juveniles ages
twelve to seventeen and eighteen to twenty-four than many of the surrounding Midwestern states.25 For that reason, it is imperative that Illinois lead
the way for other states in more effective juvenile sentencing.

II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of cruel and unusual punishment.26 The United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons found
that this “guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive
sanctions.”27 That right is derived from the idea that a punishment should be
proportional “to both the offender and the offense.”28 For adult offenders,
the Supreme Court has frequently upheld the death penalty, natural life sentence without the possibility of parole, and lengthy, consecutive term-ofyears sentences, as consistent with the Eighth Amendment. However, during the past decade, the Supreme Court has called the constitutionality of
these sentences into question in regards to juvenile offenders.29

III. RECENT TRENDS IN THE SUPREME COURT
In a series of cases beginning in 2005, the United States Supreme
Court has begun to shift the way it addresses juvenile sentencing. The following three cases will set up the basis for this Note’s argument.
23.
24.

See id.
See, e.g., Steve Bogira, The Root Cause of Chicago’s Glut of Murders, CHICAGO
READER
(July
10,
2012,
12:33
PM),
http://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2012/07/10/the-root-cause-of-chicagosglut-of-murders; Berlatsky, supra note 19; Tricia Escobedo, Despite Bloody Weekend, Chicago’s Murder Rate is Down, Police Chief Says, CNN (Apr. 25, 2014, 2:38 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/24/us/chicago-violence/.
25.
FBI,
Supplementary
Homicide
Reports
1980-2012,
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezashr/asp/off_selection.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2015). This
online table allows user to search the number of homicides per state by age. Id. A search by
this author revealed that Illinois has seen a total of 3,290 homicides by offenders between
the ages of twelve to twenty-four. Id. In contrast, in that same time period Iowa had 303
homicides, Wisconsin had 1,414, and Indiana had 1,233. Id.
26.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
27.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
28.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).
29.
E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
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ROPER V. SIMMONS

In this 2005 case, the Supreme Court held that a death penalty sentence violates a minor’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.30 At the
age of seventeen, Simmons and two others broke into a woman’s home at
two in the morning and kidnapped her.31 The three teenagers put duct tape
over the woman’s eyes and mouth, bound her hands together, and drove her
to a state park.32 Once there, they walked her to a railroad trestle and threw
her off the bridge.33 Following a jury trial, Simmons was found guilty and
given the death penalty.34
The Court examined whether the death penalty was constitutional in
this case by comparing it to similar, previously decided cases and state statutes.35 First, the Court noted that typical theories of punishment, such as
retribution and deterrence, do not apply to juveniles because minors do not
respond to punishments in the same way as adults.36 The Court compared
the Roper case to Atkins, a case in which it had decided that the death penalty was unconstitutional for those with mental retardation because those
offenders had a diminished personal culpability.37 Furthermore, the Court
noted that a majority of states prohibited the death penalty for juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen.38 Additionally, at the end of the opinion
the Court also pointed out that the United States was the only country that
still allowed juvenile offenders to be put to death.39
Finally, the Court closely analyzed the differences between juvenile
and adult offenders.40 “Because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.”41 For this
reason, courts will carefully examine a wide variety of factors before sentencing a defendant to death.42 The Supreme Court noted three general differences between juveniles and adults.43 First, juveniles do not have the

30.
Id. at 571.
31.
Id. at 556.
32.
Id.
33.
Id. at 557.
34.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005).
35.
See id. at 560-75.
36.
Id. at 571-72.
37.
Id. at 563-64.
38.
Id. at 568.
39.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
40.
Id. at 569-73.
41.
Id. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S 815, 856 (1988) (O’Connor,
J., concurring)).
42.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
43.
Id. at 569.
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same level of maturity and responsibility as adults generally do.44 Second,
“juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure.”45 Third, a minor’s personality is
more fluid, and not as well formed, as an adult’s personality.46 For these
reasons, the Supreme Court found that juveniles do not have the proper
personal culpability necessary to be given the death penalty.47
B.

GRAHAM V. FLORIDA

In 2010, the Supreme Court heard another case involving juvenile sentencing, in which it considered whether it was constitutional for a juvenile
to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a
non-homicide crime.48 Graham was seventeen years old when he was involved in a home invasion while on probation for a previous attempted robbery charge.49 Graham, along with two other young men, forcibly entered a
home by threatening the owner with a pistol.50 The group ransacked the
home and locked the homeowner in a closet.51 Later that same evening, the
group attempted a second robbery that resulted in one of the accomplices
being shot.52 Graham was apprehended after fleeing from police in a vehicle and then, after crashing into a light pole, on foot.53 He was found guilty
of all charges and given the maximum sentence: life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.54
The Supreme Court, while examining the Eighth Amendment, once
again stated that in order for a punishment to be constitutional, it must be
proportional to the crime and the offender.55 In this case, the majority of
states did allow this level of sentence for a juvenile offender.56 However,
when examined closer, the Court found that these sentences were rarely
given.57 The Supreme Court cited the Roper factors and held “that because
juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most se-

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52-53 (2010).
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 55 (2010).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 62.
Id. 62-63.
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vere punishments.”58 Furthermore, a juvenile offender who has not committed or attempted to commit a homicide was found by the Court to have
“twice diminished moral culpability:” diminished by both the age of the
offender and the nature of the crime.59
Because juveniles will end up serving longer sentences, life without
parole is especially harsh.60 The Supreme Court examined and rejected a
number of theories of punishment as justification for juveniles being given
such harsh sentences.61 These theories included retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and concerns of recidivism, which the Court determined did
not give any basis for life without parole sentences.62 Finally, the Court
noted that the sentence prevented any sort of rehabilitation from taking
place.63 Through this analysis, the Court held that natural life sentences
without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders were unconstitutional.64 A state must “give defendants . . . some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”65
C.

MILLER V. ALABAMA

In the most recent decision, the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide.66 The Court
ultimately held that, for minors, the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.67 When Evan Miller was fourteen, he beat a neighbor with a baseball
bat after the neighbor woke up to Miller trying to take his wallet.68 Miller
then lit a fire to cover up the evidence and the victim died from the injuries
and smoke inhalation.69 Miller was charged and found guilty of murder in
the course of arson, which carried a mandatory punishment of life without
the possibility of parole.70

58.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005)).
59.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 69.
60.
Id. at 70.
61.
Id. at 71-72.
62.
Id. at 71-72.
63.
Id. at 73.
64.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
65.
Id. at 75.
66.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 2462.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 2463.
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The Supreme Court acknowledged the shift it had implemented in sentencing standards for juveniles starting with Roper and Graham.71 The
Court reiterated the factors that make juveniles different from adults as the
basis for why, constitutionally, minors must be sentenced differently than
adults.72 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that it was these differences
that diminished the “penological justifications” for doling out extremely
harsh sentences to juvenile offenders, even when they are found guilty of
horrible crimes.73 The Court underlined the theme that had pervaded its last
two decisions, “youth matters in determining the appropriateness” of a
harsh sentence.74
Finally, the Court turned to the basis for its decision regarding the unconstitutionality of the mandatory sentence.75 It found that mandatory imposition of the harshest sentence available to juvenile offenders did not
allow the judge to take into account any of the differences the Supreme
Court determined to be important.76 The Court held that, in sentencing, a
judge must be allowed to consider the mitigating factors that accompany
youth or there would be too great a risk that the punishment will be disproportionate to the crime.77
D.

THE NEXT STEP

It is widely recognized by many legal scholars that the United States
Supreme Court is moving rather quickly towards abolishing life without
parole sentences for juvenile offenders entirely.78 There are several parts of
the analyses of each case that point to this inevitable shift. First, each case
acknowledges that the decisions are directly contrary to our historical understanding of juvenile sentencing.79 The Court rejects the notion of looking
at sentencing “through a historical prism” in favor of the evolving moral
and ethical standards of society.80 This opens up the Court to abolish life
without parole sentences for juveniles, even though traditionally it is a
widely practiced and accepted sentence. Second, each opinion makes it
clear that simply because a majority of state sentencing statutes do not cur71.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).
72.
Id. at 2464.
73.
Id. at 2465.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 2467.
76.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).
77.
Id. at 2469.
78.
James Donald Moorehead, What Rough Beast Awaits? Graham, Miller, and the
Supreme Court’s Seemingly Inevitable Slouch Towards Complete Abolition of Juvenile Life
Without Parole, 46 IND. L. REV. 671 (2013).
79.
E.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.
80.
See id.
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rently agree with the decisions, this will not affect the outcome.81 This argument goes hand-in-hand with the Court’s rejection of historical sentencing standards.82 Again, the Court has left open the possibility of abolishing
the harshest sentence available to juveniles.83 Finally, the Court repeatedly
emphasizes the differences between juveniles and adults as an explanation
for why each should be sentenced differently.84 The continued focus on
these differences further bolsters the argument for abolishing life sentences
without the possibility of parole for juveniles.
However, the Supreme Court has failed to establish a categorical rule
in response to how states should deal with sentencing juveniles.85 The Court
may have been concerned that a categorical rule would further prevent
judges from being able to consider any outside factors during sentencing.
Or the Court may have thought that the states could better decide the proper
sentencing scheme for themselves. Without a categorical rule, states have
unevenly applied Miller and Graham.86

IV. HOW STATES HAVE APPLIED MILLER/GRAHAM
A.

DE-FACTO LIFE SENTENCES

One of the ways states have dealt with sentencing post-Miller is
through lengthy, consecutive term-of-years sentences, also known as “defacto” life sentences.87 There has been considerable controversy surrounding this sentencing scheme and about whether it remains constitutional.88
The Miller opinion does not discuss the issue, though it has been considered
by many state courts.89 Illinois is one state where consecutive term sentences are allowed and given to juveniles.90
As recently as 2012, the California Supreme Court found that a one
hundred ten year sentence for a sixteen-year-old offender was unconstitu81.
E.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010).
82.
See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463.
83.
See id. at 2462.
84.
See, e.g., id. at 2465.
85.
Brian J. Fuller, Note, Criminal Law-A Small Step Forward in Juvenile Sentencing, But is it Enough? The United States Supreme Court Ends Mandatory Life Without Parole Sentences; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 13 WYO. L. REV. 377, 395
(2013).
86.
Id. at 394.
87.
See Therese A. Savona, The Growing Pains of Graham v. Florida: Deciphering
Whether Lengthy Term-Of-Years Sentences for Juvenile Defendants Can Equate to the Unconstitutional Sentence of Life Without the Possibility of Parole, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
182, 197 (2013).
88.
See Fuller, supra note 85.
89.
Id.
90.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-25(g) (West 2012).
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tional under Graham.91 The court found that the length of the sentence was
contrary to the mandate in Graham and did not allow the juvenile any
meaningful opportunity for release.92 However, the court did not find consecutive term sentences categorically unconstitutional.93
These de-facto life sentences are not consistent with the language or
analysis found in both Miller and Graham.94 A prison sentence that will last
sixty or more years does not allow courts to show juvenile offenders any
clemency.95 Furthermore, despite the lengthy discussion about the differences between adults and juveniles, de-facto life sentences do not give
courts any opportunity to take the differences into account when determining a sentence.96
B.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

Following Miller, states were faced with the decision of how to deal
with juveniles who had already been sentenced to life imprisonment terms.
Iowa Governor Terry Branstad chose to immediately commute the sentences of thirty-eight juveniles currently serving life terms, instead of dealing
with sentencing appeals.97 The defendants are now serving sixty-year terms
and will be eligible for parole.98 Governor Branstad chose to retroactively
apply Miller because he stated that he wanted to protect the victims and
their families from having to go through another trial and the possibility of
a more lenient sentence.99
State courts are continuing to struggle with the proper application of
Miller.100 Several states have found that Miller should not apply retroactively, including Louisiana, Alabama, and Michigan.101 Others, including Illinois, have chosen retroactive application.102 The Illinois Supreme Court in
Davis found that the decision of retroactivity depends on whether the rule
91.
Savona, supra note 87.
92.
Id. at 200.
93.
Id. at 201.
94.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (addressing the justifications for why mandatory life without parole is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders).
95.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
96.
See id.
97.
Savona, supra note 87, at 198.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
See Savona, supra note 87, at 197. “[T]he Court’s decision in Miller only exacerbates this issue, which several courts throughout the country continue to struggle with.” Id.
101.
Louisiana v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829 (La. 2013); Williams v. Alabama, No. CR-121862, 2014 WL 1392828 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 4, 2014); Michigan v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d
810 (Mich. 2014).
102.
Illinois v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, 6 N.E.3d 709.
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that comes out of Miller is substantive or procedural.103 Substantive rules
are generally applied retroactively because there is a significant risk that the
defendant is “fac[ing] a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
him.”104 Procedural rules, on the other hand, are not applied retroactively.105
The Illinois Supreme Court found that while the Miller decision did mandate a new sentencing procedure, it was the result of a substantive change
of the sentencing laws.106 Therefore, according to Davis, the rule in Miller
should apply retroactively to juvenile defendants already serving life sentences.107
Beyond the discussion of whether Miller creates a substantive or procedural rule, the Juvenile Law Center (JLC) has made several compelling
arguments in support of retroactive application.108 The JLC has filed an
amicus brief in Jones v. Commonwealth of Virginia, arguing that Donte
Jones’s sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional under Miller.109
The JLC argued that even if Miller is considered a procedural rule, it is a
“watershed rule of criminal procedure,” which should be applied retroactively.110 Additionally, once a punishment has been determined to be cruel
and unusual, to continue to impose that sentence on a person is also cruel
and unusual.111 Despite these arguments, the Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal, and Donte Jones will continue to serve his sentence of life
in prison.112
C.

CONTINUED LIFE IMPRISONMENT

The option of life imprisonment still exists as a potential sentence for
juveniles. Miller does not require a complete prohibition from life sentences, only from the sentence being imposed automatically.113 However, the
United States Supreme Court did mandate that the differences between
adults and juveniles be taken into consideration during sentencing and that,
by considering those differences, a sentence of life imprisonment would be
relatively rare.114 Nevertheless, many states have continued to apply life
103.
Id. at 721.
104.
Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004)).
105.
Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 721.
106.
Id. at 722.
107.
Id. at 722.
108.
JUVENILE LAW CTR., Jones v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Dec. 28, 2014, 12:30
PM), http://www.jlc.org/legal-docket/jones-v-commonwealth-virginia.
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
114.
Id.
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without parole to juvenile homicide offenders, while still technically being
in compliance with Miller.115
D.

OTHER SENTENCING CHALLENGES

Without a categorical rule, state courts will continue to see challenges
to sentences given to juvenile homicide offenders. Miller suggests that
courts consider certain key differences between adults and juveniles, but
does not lay out any directions for how that should be done.116 This lack of
direction means defendants will appeal their sentences alleging violation of
the Miller standard and state courts will have to decide what actually is the
standard. For example, a defendant in Pennsylvania appealed a mandatory
thirty-five year sentence for homicide and the court held that it was constitutional.117 Furthermore, an Illinois Appellate court has held that a twentyyear mandatory firearm enhancement is constitutional.118 This Note will
attempt to clear up some of the confusion left by the Miller decision by
laying out a clear path for Illinois judges to follow in deciding how to sentence juvenile homicide offenders.

V. HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS
Illinois has a long history of treating juvenile offenders differently
than adult offenders.119 In 1899, Illinois passed the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act, which created a juvenile court and a separate court system that would
emphasize rehabilitation.120 Illinois recognized early on that juveniles were
fundamentally different from adults and thus, should be treated differently
by the justice system.121 It was not until 1974 that a federal law was passed
to provide funding for separate juvenile justice systems.122 In 1998, Illinois
passed the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act.123 The purpose of the provision was to address three main goals within
the juvenile justice system: accountability, community safety, and compe115.
Atwell v. Florida, 128 So. 3d 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a
sentence of life without parole for a juvenile homicide offender was constitutional).
116.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
117.
Pennsylvania v. Lawrence, 99 A.3d 116 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
118.
Illinois v. Cohn, 2014 IL App (1st) 122562-U.
119.
Lindsay Bostwick, Policies and Procedures of the Illinois Juvenile Justice System,
ILL.
CRIM.
JUST.
INFO.
AUTHORITY
1
(Aug.
2010),
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/ResearchReports/IL_Juvenile_Justice_System_Walkth
rough_0810.pdf.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
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tency development.124 By reducing the stigma attached to juvenile offenders
and emphasizing rehabilitation and community relations, Illinois has been a
leader in the juvenile justice system.125
For a majority of young offenders in Illinois, juvenile court is where
they will be charged.126 Most young people who are charged with a crime
have committed a relatively minor offense.127 For the most serious offenders, there are a few specific circumstances under which they can be transferred to adult court.128 First, the prosecutor can request a transfer to adult
court, which is subject to approval by a juvenile court judge.129 Second,
there are a number of instances in which a juvenile delinquent is automatically transferred to adult court including, if the juvenile is at least fifteen
years old and has been charged with any of the following: “first degree
murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery with a firearm where the juvenile personally discharged the firearm, armed robbery
committed with a firearm, or aggravated vehicular hijacking committed
with a firearm.”130 Finally, a defendant who was at least thirteen at the time
of the crime will be automatically transferred to adult court if they are
charged with “first degree murder committed during the course of aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnap[p]ing.”131
Once a juvenile defendant has been transferred to adult court, they are
tried as an adult.132 If they are convicted, the offender will serve time in a
juvenile facility until they reach the age of seventeen.133 At that point, the
offender is transferred to an adult facility to serve the remainder of their
sentence.134

VI. CURRENT JUVENILE SENTENCING IN ILLINOIS
Clearly, Illinois has consistently recognized the benefits of treating juvenile delinquents differently than adult offenders. However, due to the
numerous circumstances in which a juvenile defendant can be transferred to
adult court, it is obvious that Illinois still has a ways to go in addressing
serious sentencing issues. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Bostwick, supra note 119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bostwick, supra note 119.
Id.
Id.; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130(4)(a) (West 2012).
See Bostwick, supra note 119.
Id.
Id.
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Eighth Amendment has continuously been used to limit juvenile sentencing
throughout the United States.135 Historically, sentencing has been viewed as
needing to be proportional to the crime committed.136 Due to a juvenile’s
very nature, the age of a juvenile plays a role in examining that proportionality.137
In Illinois, juveniles transferred to adult court are generally subject to
the same sentencing guidelines as adult offenders.138 These sentences can
take various forms. For example, a juvenile convicted of a Class X felony
will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no less than six years and no
more than thirty years.139 If the juvenile defendant is sentenced to several
terms, that sentence can be served either concurrently or consecutively.
Consecutive terms are permitted at the discretion of the judge.140 The court
is free to consider the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant
to determine whether consecutive terms are necessary to protect the public.141 In various other circumstances, serving several term-of-years sentences consecutively is mandatory. These circumstances include aggravated
sexual assault, a Class X felony in which the defendant inflicted a severe
bodily injury, aggravated possession of child pornography, and more.142
Illinois also continues to sentence juveniles to natural life in prison
under various situations.143 A juvenile convicted of first degree murder can
be sentenced to life imprisonment if the court finds that the murder was
particularly heinous or brutal, if the victim is a peace officer, or if the victim is under the age of twelve and the murder occurs during the course of
aggravated sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, or aggravated kidnapping.144 There are also several circumstances involving the use of firearms
that will automatically lengthen a sentence.145
A judge may consider various different factors when deciding whether
to extend the proscribed sentence for a juvenile.146 These include, but are
not limited to, the defendant’s conduct, criminal history, the age and handicap status of the victim, whether the crime was related to gang activity, and
whether the punishment will serve to deter others.147 These factors fit in
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).
Id.
See Bostwick, supra note 119.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-25 (West 2012).
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-4 (West 2012).
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Id.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1 (West 2012).
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Id.
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with the considerations suggested by the United States Supreme Court in
Roper, but they do not go far enough.148 As one can see from the exhaustive
circumstances described by the Illinois Compiled Statutes, there are many
circumstances remaining that allow for Illinois courts to sentence juveniles
to consecutive sentences, lengthy sentences, and, in a few cases, natural life
sentences. This is problematic because, not only are the sentences being
imposed contrary to the direction laid out by the Supreme Court in Roper,
Graham, and Miller, but also it presents a moral and ethical question about
how juveniles in this country, and especially in Illinois, are treated by the
justice system.

VII. WHERE SHOULD ILLINOIS GO FROM HERE
A.

WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE

Earlier this year, the Illinois Supreme Court appropriately decided to
retroactively apply Miller to juveniles previously given automatic natural
life sentences.149 The court reviewed the case of Addolfo Davis, the young
man discussed at the beginning of this Note, who has now been in jail for
more than twenty years.150 The court examined whether the Miller decision
imposed a substantive or procedural rule in determining whether it should
be applied retroactively.151 Ultimately, the court held that Miller created a
substantive rule and, as such, would be applied retroactively.152 However,
the court further noted that only mandatory life sentences were invalidated
and maintained that such sentences could be imposed at the discretion of
the trial judge.153
B.

WHAT ILLINOIS NEEDS TO CHANGE

1.

Statutory Sentencing Changes

The first step in changing how Illinois deals with juvenile sentencing
is statutorily. The necessary changes are essentially two-fold: first, eliminate life without parole sentences for juveniles entirely, and second, end
mandatory sentencing schemes for juveniles. These changes reflect the

148.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Illinois v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, 6 N.E.3d 709.
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Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 722-23.
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shifting attitudes of the Supreme Court and will put Illinois at the forefront
of ethical and moral sentencing of juveniles.
The direction of the United States Supreme Court away from life
without parole sentences for juveniles is obvious. First in Roper, the Supreme Court abolished the death penalty as a sentencing option for juveniles.154 Then in Graham, the Court held that life sentences for juveniles
convicted of non-homicide crimes were unconstitutional.155 Finally, the
Miller decision prohibited mandatory natural life sentences.156 The Supreme
Court has followed a clear path away from life without parole sentences.
Following the reasoning laid out by the Court in these three cases, it can
easily be seen how the Court would deal with abolishing the sentence entirely.
First, the severity of the punishment should be taken into consideration. Justice Elena Kagan, in Miller, wrote in her opinion that as life without parole is the harshest punishment available, it is difficult to justify its
use on juveniles.157 Currently, a sentence of natural life without parole is
the harshest sentence that may be imposed on a juvenile defendant. The
Court in addressing all three of the precedential cases has shied away from
allowing juveniles to receive what are viewed as the cruelest sentences:
death and life in prison.158 It follows logically that there will come a point
in which the Court will move away from the latter punishment entirely for
young offenders.
The next step of legal analysis will be to examine the differences between juveniles and adults.159 These differences include the lack of maturity
in juveniles, the increased influence of peer pressure, and the transitory
state of the juveniles’ personality traits.160 It is these differences that have
led the Court to hold that juveniles have a lessened culpability and are
therefore, “less deserving of the most severe punishments.”161 In fact, the
Supreme Court has “held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.”162 As established above, life
without parole is the last remaining severe punishment for juveniles.163 Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.164 If it is to be believed that juveniles are so different from adults that
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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they cannot be held to the same responsibility for their crimes, it would
follow that a sentence that puts a juvenile in prison for the rest of his or her
natural life is cruel and unusual, because the juvenile does not possess the
requisite culpability.
The third part of the analysis is to examine how the punishment of life
imprisonment fits within the accepted theories of punishment. The basis for
these theories goes hand in hand with the already mentioned differences
between juveniles and adults.165 First, deterrence is not an appropriate justification for the sentence because, as juveniles do not possess the proper risk
assessment skills, they are not deterred by threat of punishment.166 Second,
the United States Supreme Court noted that the basis for retribution rationale is the amount of blame placed upon the defendant.167 Again, as we
have determined juveniles to have a diminished culpability, retribution is
not an adequate justification for such a lengthy sentence.168 Finally, rehabilitation is not served by these sentences, as the defendant does not have the
opportunity of release.169 Life imprisonment for juveniles goes directly
against the analysis in Graham that led the Supreme Court to state that nonhomicide offenders must be given reasonable and meaningful opportunity
for release.170 Without any reasonable hope that he or she may one day be
set free, there is no incentive for the juvenile to reflect and take responsibility for his or her actions, thus destroying any hope for rehabilitation.171 Following this analysis, it is clear that by the guidelines set by the United
States Supreme Court both life without parole sentences and lengthy term
of years sentences should be considered unconstitutional.172
Finally, the attitudes of the community should be considered. In Roper, the Court was especially concerned that a majority of states had already
rejected the death penalty for juvenile defendants.173 Graham noted that
community consensus is not “determinative of whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual.”174 Most states still impose life without parole on juve-

165.
E.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 2465.
168.
Id.
169.
Id.
170.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
171.
Id. at 79. “A young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave
prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible individual.” Id.
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See id.; Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 6, Chaz Bunch v. Ohio, 135 S. Ct. 152 (2014) (No. 12-558). The United States Supreme
Court denied the petition for writ certiorari in this case. Id.
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Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
174.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
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nile defendants in certain circumstances. However, the United States is the
only country to do so, as noted earlier in this Note.175
This analysis supports the view that the Supreme Court will continue
to trend away from the use of life without parole sentences, until they are
abolished entirely. The second step Illinois should take in addressing juvenile sentencing is to do away with mandatory sentencing schemes for juvenile defendants. This will best be accomplished by implementing individualized sentencing hearings in which the judge is required to consider several
factors. The Court in Miller stated clearly that, like with death penalty sentences, a life imprisonment sentence for juveniles requires an individualized
sentencing hearing.176 Though Miller only considered life without parole
sentences, the logical next step in the legal analysis will be to require these
hearings for juvenile offenders who have been convicted and could face
lengthy prison sentences.177

2.

Individualized Sentencing

By requiring the trial court to “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison,” the Supreme Court signaled that how trial
courts sentence juvenile offenders should begin to change.178 As Miller
already mandates sentencing hearings before convicting a juvenile offender
to life without parole, Illinois should change its approach to juvenile sentencing by also requiring individualized sentencing hearings for young
criminals facing a lengthy term in prison.179 Though the United States Supreme Court has not yet explicitly stated that lengthy term of years sentences require such hearings, several arguments can be made in support of mandating them.
For example, if a fifteen year old is convicted of murder in Illinois, he
or she may be sentenced to sixty years imprisonment.180 On release, he or
she could be seventy-five years old. However, according to a study done in
Michigan, it is unlikely that this juvenile offender will actually live to that
age. While the life expectancy for someone born today is about seventyseven years old, it is significantly lower for those who are incarcerated in
their youth.181 The average life expectancy for a prison inmate is about fif175.
Kozlowska, supra note 15.
176.
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012).
177.
See id.
178.
Id. at 2469.
179.
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180.
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2012).
181.
Deborah LaBelle, Michigan Life Expectancy Data for Youth Serving Natural
Life Sentences, ACLU OF MICHIGAN JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE INITIATIVE,
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ty-eight years.182 However, if that inmate was incarcerated as a child, his
life expectancy drops to about fifty years old.183 This is a shockingly low
life expectancy for juvenile offenders. By these numbers, any term longer
than thirty-five years, for a non-homicide offender, does not provide the
juvenile with a meaningful opportunity for release as required by Graham.184
Similar analysis, as used earlier in this Note to show how the Supreme
Court is moving away from life without parole sentences for juveniles, can
be used to argue that individualized sentencing hearings should be required
before sentencing juvenile offenders to lengthy prison sentences. The differences between juveniles and adults have been discussed throughout this
Note but they bear repeating. Juveniles lack maturity and rational decisionmaking abilities.185 Juveniles are more susceptible to peer pressure and other negative influences.186 Finally, a young person’s personality is still being
formed.187 The Supreme Court has taken these differences to mean that the
conduct of a juvenile offender is not to be considered as “morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”188 By repeatedly highlighting these differences
and stating that juveniles and adults should be judged by different standards, it logically follows that juvenile sentencing should be handled differently, even beyond that which has already been required by the United
States Supreme Court. In the Miller decision, Justice Kagan discussed the
limitations caused by mandatory sentencing schemes, in respect to life
without parole sentences, as preventing the trial court from taking into consideration the character of the offense and the individual offenders, as well
as any other possibly mitigating factors.189 This consequence of a mandatory sentence is the reason for a required, post-conviction sentencing hearing
before a juvenile can be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.190
A repeated critique of the extension of Graham and Miller is that the
decisions are inconsistent.191 In Graham, the majority extensively describes
the differences between juveniles and adults as justification for sentencing

http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Michigan-Life-ExpectancyData-Youth-Serving-Life.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
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the two classes of offenders differently.192 The majority in Miller follows
the same analysis, but stops short of creating a hardline rule, stating that in
some cases life without parole would be an appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender.193 The criticism is that if juveniles and adults are so fundamentally different, why do those differences not matter as much when the
juvenile is charged with homicide?194 This Note argues that just because
Miller does not explicitly preclude life without parole sentences that does
not diminish the change in attitudes about juvenile sentencing by the United
States Supreme Court.
As previously discussed, the life expectancy for an inmate who was
sentenced to prison as a juvenile is only fifty years old.195 With a low life
expectancy, it is conceivable that many juvenile offenders sentenced to
lengthy prison terms will die in prison. For this reason, it is just as important for juveniles who receive a lengthy term of years sentence to have
an individualized sentencing hearing as it is for a juvenile who faces a life
sentence. Looking at the statistics, the only difference between a life sentence and a lengthy term is the first guarantees the offender will die in prison, while the second makes it a statistical probability.196
Beyond probabilities and the similarities between the two types of sentences, there is precedent for requiring individualized hearings to consider
juvenile specific factors for actions other than sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison.197 At sixteen years old, Cameron Moon was indicted for
murder.198 He only had one previous conviction, a misdemeanor for keying
a car.199 At a pre-trial hearing, the State of Texas “asked the juvenile court
to order that Cameron stand trial as an adult.”200 The motion was granted
despite the state presenting no supporting evidence, and the defense presenting extensive testimony that Cameron “lacked sophistication and maturity and that he was highly amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system.”201 On appeal, the State argued that the transfer was justified based on
the nature of the crime alone.202 The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals disa192.
Id.
193.
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194.
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greed, holding that the juvenile court must consider the evidence as opposed to transferring based on the nature of the crime alone.203
Illinois should take a cue from the Texas court and require that a trial
court consider multiple factors before sentencing a juvenile homicide offender. Currently, Illinois statutes allow a trial court to consider several
factors before imposing a more severe sentence on a convicted defendant.204
The trial court may also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant in deciding whether the defendant
should serve multiple sentences consecutively.205 There are many opportunities for the trial court to use its discretion to lengthen a juvenile’s time in
prison.206 However, there are no similar standards in place that require trial
courts to consider any of the mitigating factors, discussed at length by the
United States Supreme Court, before sentencing a juvenile offender. Standards for post-conviction, individualized sentencing hearings for juvenile
offenders should be established in Illinois because juveniles are fundamentally different from adults207 and, as such, should be subject to different,
more rigorous, sentencing standards.208
The reoccurring argument against requiring individualized sentencing
hearings for juveniles, both for life and lengthy term sentences, comes out
of Harmelin v. Michigan.209 In Harmelin, the Supreme Court considered a
life sentence for an adult offender convicted of possession of cocaine.210
The Court held that “a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual
[does not] become[] so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’”211 However,
Harmelin dealt with an adult offender212 and it is reasonable for a trial court
to treat adult and juvenile offenders differently based on inherent differences.213
Additionally, juvenile offenders should be sentenced differently than
adult offenders because Illinois law makers may not have had juveniles in
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mind when writing the sentencing statutes.214 Juvenile offenders in Illinois
are transferred to adult court under a number of circumstances, either presumptively or through the discretion of the juvenile court.215 Once transferred, the juvenile offenders are subject to the same sentencing scheme as
the adult offenders.216 In essence, despite repeated discussion by the Supreme Court about the fundamental characteristics of juveniles, which lessen their culpability, those characteristics have never been considered prior
to sentencing juvenile offenders.
Based on these assertions, it is clear that in order to properly follow
the legal analysis of Miller,217 Illinois should adopt a new rule requiring
trial courts to consider the characteristics of the juvenile before sentencing
him or her, for both possible life without parole and lengthy term sentences.
This new rule should go beyond allowing trial courts to have discretion
when deciding the length of a juvenile’s sentence. For guidance, lawmakers
should look to a recent case out of Ohio.218 Eric Long was seventeen years
old when he was involved in several crimes stemming from two shootings
in March of 2009.219 Following his conviction, at a sentencing hearing, he
was sentenced to two consecutive life terms.220 Long appealed, arguing that
the hearing needed to be more than discretionary, the judge should have
considered the Miller factors.221 The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed and
ruled that the trial court must consider mitigating factors during a sentencing hearing.222
Like Ohio, Illinois should require sentencing hearings that allow the
judge discretion and necessitate the consideration of factors related to the
offender’s special circumstances as a juvenile.223 Unfortunately, Miller fails
to lay out a clear process for what exactly state courts should consider when
sentencing juvenile offenders.224 For direction, Illinois lawmakers should
look to how other states have handled sentencing hearings. In a recent case,
the Supreme Court of Wyoming clearly laid out a number of factors that
214.
See id. at 2472. Justice Kagan acknowledges that any juvenile sentenced to life
in prison is done so “through the combination of two independent statutory provisions.” Id.
The first allows the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult court and the second lays out the
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215.
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would be ideal for Illinois to adopt.225 The factors the Wyoming Court used
were pulled from Miller and organized into a clear list.226 During a postconviction sentencing hearing, a trial court should scrutinize the following
factors before sentencing a juvenile offender: (a) the character and history
of the juvenile offender and the specific circumstances of the crime; (b) the
background and emotional and mental development of the juvenile offender; (c) the offender’s age and characteristics that go along with it including
immaturity and ability to appreciate risks; (d) the juvenile’s family and
home environment; (e) the circumstances of the crime, the extent to which
the juvenile was involved, and the extent to which peer or familial pressure
may have factored into the juvenile’s participation; (f) “the juvenile’s relative inability to deal with police and prosecutors or to assist his own attorney”; and (g) the offender’s potential for rehabilitation.227 The trial court
should be required to enumerate these factors on the record in order to ensure that each one has been properly scrutinized and applied to the specific
circumstances.
The trial court should examine these factors at the time of sentencing,
not at a parole hearing after the juvenile has served a portion of their sentence.228 If Illinois were to wait until a parole hearing to consider the proposed factors it would be too late.229 For example, if all juvenile offenders
convicted of felony murder in Illinois were given extended prison sentences
without the appropriate scrutiny at sentencing, but would receive a parole
hearing after serving a portion of their sentence which would take into account all of diminishing factors, it would not be enough.230 This would be
“[i]mposing a one-size-fits-all approach to juvenile sentencing” that is directly contrary to the concerns the Supreme Court has with giving juvenile

225.
Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013). The Supreme Court of Wyoming
considered the appeal of Wyatt Bear Cloud after he was convicted on charges stemming
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offenders the harshest possible sentences.231 In order to be in compliance
with Miller, Illinois must require that the trial court consider all of the mitigating factors prior to sentencing.232
Of course there will be instances in which it is necessary to sentence
the juvenile offender to an extended prison sentence or, until it is abolished,
a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.233 The Supreme Court in
Miller signals that it is not yet prepared to completely “foreclose a sentencer’s ability” to sentence a juvenile offender to life in prison.234 Likewise, trial courts in Illinois should still be allowed to issue lengthy term
sentences in the appropriate circumstances.235 However, such a harsh punishment should not be common given the many mitigating factors associated with youth.236
In order for an Illinois trial court to sentence a juvenile offender to life
without parole or to a lengthy term, the judge should be required to conclude on the record that several factors apply to the situation.237 These factors are:
[(a)] The nature and circumstances of the offense
are unrelated to the hallmarks of adolescent development and reflect the child’s irreparable corruption; [(b)] The nature and circumstances of the offense are unrelated to the child’s family and home
environment and reflect the child’s irreparable corruption; [(c)] The child’s participation in the offense, including the extent of his participation,
were unrelated to family and/or peer pressures;
[(d)] The child’s level of participation in the offense, including the child’s participation in both the
planning and commission of the offense, reflect the
child’s irreparable corruption; [(e)] The child possessed the sophistication to competently negotiate
the criminal justice system, including his interactions with law enforcement; and [(f)] The child’s
culpability, age, mental capacity, maturity, crimi231.
Id. at 8.
232.
See id. at 6.
233.
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See Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014) (No. 2012-1410). The following list of factors is
adopted from a brief in amici curiae written by the Juvenile Law Center. Id. The factors are
consistent with those set out in Miller. Id.
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nal sophistication, and other factors dictate a finding that the child cannot be rehabilitated.238
The harshest punishments should appropriate only when all of the previous factors have been met.239 In doing so, it ensures that the sentence is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller that such punishments are uncommon.240

3.

Meaningful Opportunity for Release

Unless the trial court determines that it is necessary to sentence the juvenile offender to a lengthy prison term or life without parole, the juvenile
must be given a meaningful opportunity for release, consistent with Graham.241 The Graham decision stated that the opportunity for release must be
“based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”242 The Supreme
Court, however, leaves it up to the states to determine what compliance
with this mandate should require.243
For Illinois, compliance with a meaningful opportunity for release
should include early parole hearings that review the benefits and disadvantages of continued incarceration.244 It is important for the parole hearings to commence before the juvenile offender reaches old age245 because,
for many criminals who begin a pattern of crime at a young age, these offenders are likely to outgrow their antisocial behavior as they age and mature.246 Based on this sharp drop off in criminal activity, the parole board
should look closely at the juvenile offender’s current age, maturity, and
behavior.247 Though it is difficult to accurately determine which juvenile
238.
Id.
239.
See id.
240.
Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014) (No. 2012-1410).
241.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
See Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014) (No. 2012-1410).
245.
‘Old age’ for the purposes of parole hearings should be determined per life
expectancies for juveniles sentenced to lengthy prison terms. See supra note 181. For example, if the life expectancy of a juvenile in prison is fifty years of age, a parole hearing would
need to be set well before that age to be in accordance with the Graham mandate. See id.
246.
See id.; MODELS FOR CHANGE, Research on Pathways to Desistance: December
2012 Update, (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/357
[hereinafter MODELS FOR CHANGE] (download PDF file of the report by clicking the “Download” button on the upper left-hand side of page). In a study of 1,300 serious offenders over
seven years, between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three, only ten percent continued to
report high levels of antisocial behaviors. Id.
247.
See id.
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offenders will continue to act in an antisocial manner, one of the greatest
indicators of future criminal activity is a substance abuse disorder.248 Furthermore, family involvement in the treatment of the substance abuse disorder has been shown to have the longest lasting effects.249 Therefore, the
parole board should also carefully consider the level of family support
available to the juvenile and whether any substance abuse issues are apparent.250
Additionally, it is important for the parole board to note the access the
juvenile offender had to rehabilitative services and vocational training.251
The Graham Court stressed the importance of rehabilitation, especially in
relation to juvenile inmates.252 The parole board must be used to ensure that
juvenile offenders are being given the proper opportunities to assist them in
rehabilitation and possible training to make potential future release more
successful.253
Finally, it is very important for the parole board to focus on the juvenile offender’s age and relative lack of maturity at the time of the offense,
as opposed to the seriousness of the crime.254 The Supreme Court in Roper
advised that it was likely “that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any
particular crime would overpower the mitigating arguments based on youth
as a matter of course.”255 Therefore, while it is important for the parole
board to consider the punitive and incapacitation natures of the punishment,
that should not be the main focus of their review.

VIII. CONCLUSION
On December 1, 2014, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari on Addolfo Davis’s case.256 In doing so, it al-

248.
See id.
249.
See id.
250.
See MODELS FOR CHANGE, supra note 246.
251.
See Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014) (No. 2012-1410), .
252.
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
253.
See id. (noting that juvenile offenders are “most in need of and receptive to
rehabilitation”).
254.
See Brief for Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
11, State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio 2014) (No. 2012-1410).
255.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005); see also Brief for Juvenile Law
Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11-12, State v. Long, 8 N.E.3d 890 (Ohio
2014) (No. 2012-1410).
256.
Jason Mast, Supreme Court Declines Review of JLWOP Case; Retroactivity
Stands in Illinois but Inconsistency in U.S., THE YOUTH PROJECT (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.chicago-bureau.org/supreme-court-declines-review-jlwop-case-retroactivitystands-illinois-inconsistency-u-s/.
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lowed retroactive application of Miller to stand in Illinois.257 On May 4,
2015, a hearing was held to determine if Davis should receive a new sentence.258 Cook County Judge Angela Munari Petrone declined to change
Davis’s sentence, despite testimony that Davis had since reformed.259
If Illinois were to implement the two statutory changes suggested by
this Note, abolishing life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders
and requiring individualized sentencing hearings, it would lead this nation
in ethical juvenile sentencing. These changes can be accomplished by educating lawmakers and judges in Illinois about the differences between adult
and juvenile offenders. Increased understanding about the mitigating factors
and diminished culpability associated with youth is vital to the entire nation. Addressing juvenile sentencing may be the answer to one of the many
problems the United States faces with its criminal justice system.

257.
Id.
258.
ABC 7 EYE WITNESS NEWS, Convicted Murderer Addolfo Davis Re-Sentenced
to Life in Prison (May 6, 2015, 8:13 PM), http://abc7chicago.com/news/convicted-murdereraddolfo-davis-re-sentenced-to-life-in-prison/695272/.
259.
Id.

